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Introduction 
 Four years after his passing, Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan was back in the 
news.  This past summer, a new book entitled Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of 
the Radical Right's Stealth Plan for America by Duke University history professor Nancy 
McLean, was published.  It has been advertised as an “intellectual biography” of James 
Buchanan, though a cursory review of some interviews with the author reveals the book has 
more to do with political ideologies than with economics.  The book’s release has caused 
quite a bit of controversy from all parts of the political spectrum.  One headline in The 
Washington Post read: “The beliefs of economist James Buchanan conflict with basic 
democratic norms.  Here’s Why” (Chwe, 2017) This was followed the following week with an 
article: “Was Nobel Laureate James Buchanan really opposed to democracy? Not at all.” 
(Vanberg, 2017) There were many other examples from under every rock of the political 
spectrum.  However, much of the disagreement was on Buchanan’s supposed political 
ideology and agenda, not his economic theories.  It should be quickly noted that Buchanan 
described himself as apolitical: 
I resist, and resist strongly, any and all efforts to pull me toward 
positions of advising on this or that policy or cause. I sign no 
petitions, join no political organizations, advise no party, serve no 
lobbying effort. Yet the public’s image of me, and especially as 
developed through the media after the Nobel Prize in 1986, is that of 
a right-wing libertarian zealot who is antidemocratic, anti-egalitarian, 
and antiscientific. I am, of course, none of these and am, indeed, the 
opposites. Properly understood, my position is both democratic and 
egalitarian, and I am as much a scientist as any of my peers in 
economics. But I am passionately individualistic, and my emphasis 
on individual liberty does set me apart from many of my academic 
colleagues whose mind-sets are mildly elitist and, hence, collectivist. 
(Buchanan, quoted in Formaini, 2003, p3) 
Having dispensed of the emotionally overcharged ideological debates on defining 
Buchanan, a more interesting and vibrant discussion can be had from the history of 
economic thought perspective.  Buchanan won the Nobel prize in 1986, primarily for his work 
on public choice theory, which he spearheaded with the 1962 book The Calculus of Consent, 
co-authored with Gordon Tullock.  Another development in economics that Buchanan can 
claim as his own was the birth of the Virginia School of Political Economy.  There is a 
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plethora of papers claiming, to some degree or another, that Buchanan and these two sub-
fields fall under the umbrella of the Austrian economic school.  There are other historians, 
however, that point to links between Buchanan and the neoclassical approach, primarily 
through connections with the likes of George Stigler and Milton Friedman.  There are still 
others that take a less binary view, claiming that Buchanan was a link or bridge between the 
two schools of thought, though some of the more devout economists from either school 
would quickly deny the possibility of such a construct. 
I posit that, allowing for a slight amount of breathing room, James Buchanan’s 
economic writings are more Austrian than anything else.  From his earliest writings to his last 
publications, Buchanan clearly had an Austrian-leaning approach.  Additionally, many of the 
criticisms he laid out about the economics profession were directed toward the more 
neoclassical minded amongst his peers.  While the act of criticizing neoclassicals does not 
indicate that Buchanan was an Austrian, it does seem to lay to rest any conclusions that he 
was a neoclassical economist himself. 
To prove Buchanan’s Austrian leanings, I first attempt to define what it means to be 
an Austrian.  As will be shown, there has been a modicum of debate on this issue, but there 
are some general points that the majority seem to agree with.  I then show, through 
Buchanan’s own writings as well as analyses by his peers, how Buchanan fits within each of 
the Austrian ideals.  The next section consists of additional writings and statements by 
Buchanan that, while not specifically addressing any of the Austrian tenets, are still either 
pro-Austrian, anti-neoclassical, or both.  I also present a selection of alternative views of 
Buchanan, such as claiming that he was a neoclassical or otherwise mainstream economist.  
Finally, I conclude with some closing remarks. 
With such differing points of view as to which label to attach to Buchanan, there 
would seem to be some confusion or disagreement as to what it means to belong to either 
the Austrian or neoclassical school.  And so, following the advice of Voltaire (1843) who 
wrote, “Define your terms…or we shall never understand each other,” it is important to 
describe what is meant by both neoclassical economics and Austrian economics.  I will then 
provide examples of how Buchanan should be placed in the Austrian camp. 
Definitions 
 
E. Roy Weintraub (2002: p1) briefly summarizes neoclassical economics as buyers 
maximizing their utility and producers maximizing their profits, both subject to relevant 
constraints.  There are subjective elements to price determinations, leading to buyers paying 
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more for an object than it is worth by strict classical definitions.  Value was not only 
determined by costs of production but also by the relationship between the object and the 
owner.  Additionally, individuals and firms make their choices at the margins; they will always 
continue to buy or produce if utility or profits are increasing, ceasing action the moment the 
increase stops.  Weintraub (2002: p2) expands on the maximizing principle by describing 
three fundamental assumptions within neoclassical economics: 
1) People have rational preferences among outcomes;  
2) Individuals maximize utility and firms maximize profits;  
3) People act independently based on full and relevant information. 
 
 With these assumptions in place, neoclassical models depict an economy that is 
always in equilibrium.  The popularity of neoclassical thinking “is connected to the 
‘scientificization’ or ‘mathematization’ of economics in the twentieth century.”  (Weintraub, 
2002, p3) It has become so prevalent, in fact, Weintraub (2002: p1) quipped that instead of 
President Richard Nixon’s statement “We are all Keynesians”, he should have said “We’re all 
neoclassicals now, even the Keynesians.” 
Defining Austrian Economics isn’t as cut and dry.  The origins of the Austrian school 
date back to the late 19th century with Carl Menger, but since then the school and its label 
went through its own evolution from Menger to Mises, Hayek, and others.  According to 
Kirzner (2008: p8), because of this indirect developmental path, “the term ‘Austrian 
Economics’ has come to evoke a number of different connotations in contemporary 
professional discussion.”  Ebeling addresses these “divisions” within the Austrian school: 
We need to keep in mind that there never was a uniform Austrian 
School of Economics. While Menger’s writings were the beginning of 
the Austrian School, there emerged differences of emphasis and 
approach… Rather than be dismayed or concerned about “divisions” 
within the Austrian School, it is really a sign of vibrant growth and 
innovation, as different individuals see possibilities and avenues for 
research and development within those generally shared ideas that 
make up the starting points of the Austrian approach.  (Northwood 
University, 2010, p8) 
Baird (1989) examines the etymology of “Austrian Economics” and presents the 
following five tenets as forming the backbone of the approach:  
1. Subjectivism on both demand and supply sides 
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2. Focus on methodological individualism 
3. Focus on exchange rather than optimization 
4. Focus on market processes rather than equilibrium states 
5. Understanding that economics is an “explanatory” rather than “exact” science 
(According to Kirzner (2008: p6), Fritz Machlup had frequently listed six main ideals of 
Austrian economics, while Boettke (2008: pp 2-6) came up with his own list of ten separate 
tenets.  While all the lists certainly have major similarities, the differences would appear to 
prove Kirzner’s observation about differing connotations.) 
 It is interesting to note that while some economists might equate the term ‘Austrian 
Economics’ with an approach based on propositions like those listed by Baird (1989: p203), 
Boettke (2008: pp 2-6), or Kirzner (2008: p6), there are also those both within and without 
the economic profession for whom the term “has come to be associated less with a unique 
methodology, or with specific economic doctrines, than with libertarian ideology in political 
and social discussion.”  (Kirzner, 2008, p8) Kirzner describes Murray N. Rothbard as one 
who has reinforced this view.  This only serves to reinforce the necessity of “defining our 
terms” when debating which school Buchanan may belong to. 
Buchanan’s Background and Influences 
 
Buchanan entered the economics PhD program at the University of Chicago in 1945, 
after serving four years in the United States Navy.  While he doesn’t describe his young 
adult years as being particularly political, he grew up in a predominantly “Roosevelt 
Democrat” household.  On attending a predominantly conservative University of Chicago, he 
stated “[h]ad I known about the ideological character of the Chicago faculty I might have 
chosen to go elsewhere.”  (Buchanan, 2007, p4) By his own description, he entered Chicago 
as a “libertarian socialist… antistate, antigovernment, antiestablishment… [including] the 
establishment that controlled the United States economy.” (Buchanan, 2007, p5) 
This somewhat radical sentiment did not last for very long, however, thanks to two 
events during his time at Chicago.  During his first term, Buchanan was a student in Frank 
Knight’s price theory course, and it was there that he says he converted to a free market 
enthusiast.  Throughout the remainder of his time as a student, as well as after completing 
his PhD, Knight remained a strong intellectual influence on Buchanan.  As quoted in 
Formaini (2003: p1), Buchanan explained that from Knight he was taught “the message that 
there exists no god whose pronouncements deserve elevation to the sacrosanct, whether 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3270253 
god within or without the scientific academy.  Everything, everyone, anywhere, anytime – all 
is open to challenge and criticism.”   
Certainly, the sins of the father, or in this case, the views of the professor, shall not 
be visited upon the student.  But it can clarify Buchanan’s approach to economic thought to 
briefly examine the major influences on his development.  Frank Knight is one of the 
founders of the Chicago School of economics, which is certainly neoclassical.  A straight line 
can be drawn from Knight to neoclassical thinkers such as Friedman and Stigler.  
(Henderson, 2007, p1)  
Additionally, Knight took issue with some aspects of the Austrian school.  Klein 
(2016: p1) called him a “harsh critic of Austrian capital theory” and pointed out that he was “a 
key developer of perfect competition theory – anathema to Austrians…”  In an interview 
posted online on a Northwood University blog, Dr. Richard Ebeling (Northwood University, 
2010: p4) expands on this view, pointing out that Knight “did not agree with Mises or Hayek 
about the impossibility of economic calculation under socialism, and that he was very far 
from being an advocate of laissez-faire.”   
Based on this cursory examination, one could label Knight as a neoclassical, like his 
proteges Friedman, Stigler, and maybe even Buchanan.  And perhaps, as will be seen later, 
this is exactly what some economists have done.  But as Ebeling (Northwood University, 
2010: p4) goes on to explain, Knight also showed some affinity towards Austrian ideals.  Like 
the Austrians, Knight “believed that economics could not be moulded along the lines of the 
natural sciences” and that there were “limits to the application of mathematics in economics.”  
(Indeed, Boettke (1998: p24) explains that through Knight, Buchanan came to the same 
conclusion that economics is not a science in the traditional sense.)  Knight stressed the 
“importance of introspection as a source of knowledge in the study of human action and 
choice,” and “argued that one could not ignore the "subjectivist" elements to social and 
economic processes.”  (Northwood University, 2010, p4) Clearly, Frank Knight did not fit 
squarely into a single classification of economic school of thought.  At a minimum, he was 
someone who proves the need for some fluidity in assigning such labels. 
 The other major influential event for Buchanan’s development as an economist was 
his chance reading of an 1896 paper on taxation by Knut Wicksell, wherein Wicksell 
discussed changing the rules by which political agents act and questioned the benevolence 
of said agents.  While Wicksell is associated with the Stockholm School of economics, his 
work is generally credited as leading to developments in public choice theory, Keynesian 
economics and the Austrian school.  (Formaini, 2004, p3) It was from Wicksell, according to 
Boettke (1998: p24), that Buchanan learned that “politics needs to be understood in an 
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exchange framework.”  This is certainly an “Austrian-esque” approach to politics.  
Additionally, Formaini (2003: p1) points out that Buchanan learned from Wicksell that 
“governments are not efficient, purely altruistic entities that effortlessly correct market 
imperfections…[they] are aggregates of individuals pursuing private rather than public 
interest...” This focus on individualism within governments also fits with the Austrian school’s 
approach.  So, again, we have an economist who was a major influence on Buchanan 
whose work can be placed both within and without the Austrian school umbrella. 
Buchanan and… Cost and Subjectivism 
 
 Both neoclassicals and Austrians would agree that utility is subjective.  But from the 
days of Alfred Marshall and the neoclassicals who followed in his footsteps, cost 
determination was objective, based on the intrinsic value of the resources utilized in 
production.  As DiLorenzo (1990: p181) explains, “[t]o neoclassical economists cost is 
objective in that it can be estimated ex post by external observers, even though market 
values are set by the subjective evaluations of market participants.”  By implication, then, 
there is no choice involved in an objective cost theory.  However, at least according to the 
Austrian viewpoint, all economic actions involve choices made by individual human minds.  
This means subjective preferences.  So, for Austrians, “[costs] are… subjective because 
they are themselves determined by the value of alternative uses of scarce resources.” 
(Boettke, 2008, p3) Buchanan took the same view. 
 James Buchanan published his first book, Public Principles of Public Debt, in 1958.  
It was his attempt to “demonstrate the fallacies of the Keynesian orthodoxy” via the political 
theories he had been developing while also stressing the importance of conducting 
economic analysis under the constraint that real individuals make real choices. (Boettke, 
1987, p9) One of the problems Buchanan saw with the new approach to fiscal policy was the 
focus on aggregation and the lack of understanding that governments and nations were not 
organic bodies but rather are made up of individuals.  Buchanan wrote in that first book, as 
quoted in Boettke (1987: p9), “It is misleading to speak of group sacrifice or burden or 
payment or benefit unless such aggregates can be broken down into component parts which 
may be conceptually or actually imputed to the individual or family units in the group.”  
Because of the reliance on aggregation as well as the nature of public debt, the Keynesian 
model lost sight of when the costs are incurred and by whom.  As Buchanan saw it, “the 
problem with fiscal theory, therefore, was a misunderstanding of the basic principles of 
opportunity cost and economic decision-making.”  (Boettke, 1987, p9) 
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 In 1969, to further clarify his view on the problems with public debt, Buchanan 
published Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory.  Boettke (1987: p9) referred to 
Cost and Choice as “Buchanan’s most Austrian book.”  And according to DiLorenzo (1990: 
p180), Buchanan considers the book “to be his most important theoretical contribution.”  
Buchanan explains his problem with the objective cost theory used in the Keynesian public 
debt analysis by asking: 
For whom is this cost relevant? This becomes a critically important 
question. Cost as just defined is faced in the strict sense only by the 
automaton, the pure economic man, who inhabits the scientist's 
model… In the strict sense, this theory is not a theory of choice at all. 
Individuals do not choose; they behave predictably in response to 
objectively measurable changes in their environment.  (Buchanan, 
1969, p40) 
 While Buchanan (1969: pXV) states in the preface to the book that “[l]atter-day 
Austrians especially may suggest, with some justification, that the theory developed is 
properly labeled ‘Austrian,'” he gives much of the original credit to Philip Wicksteed.  As 
Buchanan (1969: p40) explains it, economists from the London School of Economics as well 
as Mises and Hayek refined what Wicksteed had published in his 1910 work The Common 
Sense of Political Economy.  In describing this combined work on subjective cost theory, 
Buchanan (1969: p41) asserts that: 
The essential element in this concept is the direct relationship 
between cost and the act of choice, a relationship that does not exist 
in the neoclassical predictive theory. In the London-Austrian 
conception, by contrast, cost becomes the negative side of any 
decision, the obstacle that must be got over before one alternative is 
selected. Cost is that which the decision-taker sacrifices or gives up 
when he makes a choice. It consists in his own evaluation of the 
enjoyment or utility that he anticipates having to forego as a result of 
selection among alternative courses of action. 
 Buchanan (1969: pp 42-43) does, however, acknowledge the existence of some 
objectively observable costs.  Some costs are “choice-influencing,” and these are subjective 
in nature and are directly influential in affecting the choice. “Choice-influenced” costs, on the 
other hand, are those costs that are incurred because of the choice having been made and 
are objective in nature.  As Buchanan explains it: 
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Having committed himself to one course of action rather than 
another and having presumably made some rational estimation of 
the costs that this would embody, the individual “suffers” the 
consequences. He may not regret his prior decision, but, at the same 
time, he may undergo “pain” or “sacrifice” when he is required to 
reduce his utility levels. Whether or not choices were rightly or 
wrongly made has little direct relevance to the existence of this 
choice-influenced “cost.” (Buchanan, 1969, p 42) 
 Buchanan (1969: p43) makes an important observation regarding the difference 
between the two types of cost: “Strictly speaking, only choice-influencing cost represents an 
evaluation of sacrificed “opportunities.'' It might therefore be reasonable to limit the term 
opportunity cost to this conception.”  And it is these costs that are relevant when examining 
an economy that is not operating at full equilibrium: 
the whole purpose of the economic theory in which cost is relevant is 
to demonstrate how choices made in nonequilibrium settings will 
generate shifts toward equilibrium.  And choices in disequilibrium 
must be informed by opportunity costs that cannot, even indirectly, 
be represented by measured outlays. In disequilibrium, the 
opportunity costs involved in taking the “wrong” decision must 
include the profits foregone in the rejection of the alternative course 
of action.  (Buchanan, 1969, pp 46-47) 
As Baird (1989: p222) explains, the above viewpoint is like that of the Austrians.  
 One important implication of Buchanan’s subjective cost theory is on the true costs of 
taxes.  The neoclassical approach to the cost of taxation focuses on who pays the taxes to 
the government and what are the welfare costs of those taxes.  Neoclassicals consider both 
items to be objectively measurable.  As Buchanan (1969: p50) explains, neoclassical public 
finance theory “examines the choice behavior of individuals and firms, but this is not the 
choice behavior that involves either the financing of public goods or the selection among 
taxing alternatives. The individual or firm is assumed to be subjected to an imposed change 
in the alternatives of private or market choice.” 
 For DiLorenzo (1990: pp 183-184), an economist in the neoclassical approach to tax 
policy becomes an “advisor to political decision makers.”  He suggests the tax policy that 
would raise the necessary revenue while also making sure to minimize the welfare costs to 
society.  In this scenario, the economist “constructs a social welfare function even if the... 
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taxpayers have no input into the construction of the social welfare function or to the choice of 
tax instruments.”   
 For Buchanan, the neoclassical approach to taxes is, in DiLorenzo’s words, 
“inherently authoritarian.”  In the true opportunity-cost sense, costs are dependent on choice, 
and choices are made by individuals.  Without being able to identify and analyze those 
individuals, as would occur in a pure aggregation model, one cannot determine the actual 
costs. 
Buchanan and… Methodological Individualism 
 
 The choices made in the market, whether that market is economic or political, are 
made by individuals, not collectives.  In economics, firms are often discussed as wanting to 
maximize profits and governments are said to raise taxes.  But these groups are made up of 
individuals making those choices.  “Only individuals think, evaluate, plan, and act.  Clubs, 
firms, states, nations, and publics are merely groups, or collectives, of individuals.”  (Baird, 
1989, p205) To understand what a group is doing one must examine what the individuals in 
that group are doing.  This sentiment is shared by neoclassicals and Austrians alike, and it is 
a major part of public choice theory. 
 Throughout his career, Buchanan was a very prolific writer.  But certainly, his most 
well-known work came in 1962 when he co-authored The Calculus of Consent – Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy with Gordon Tullock.  It was this effort that laid the 
groundwork for public choice theory that would dominate Buchanan’s career and result in 
him being awarded the Nobel prize in 1986.  In describing public choice theory, Tullock says 
“[b]y assuming that voters, politicians and bureaucrats are mainly self-interested, public 
choice uses economic tools to deal with the traditional problems of political science.”  
(Tullock, 2008, p1)   
 Some non-economists reading that description might focus on the second part 
regarding the use of economics to examine politics.  But they would be missing out on a vital 
assumption – that politicians are focused on their own self interests.  The government is not 
acting as one collective body, making choices and taking actions on its own.  Instead, it is 
made up of separate individuals, each with his or her own desires and preferences.  And so, 
to fully understand the decisions made by governments, one must examine the interests of 
those individuals with the most power.  Once that is understood as given, expecting a 
politician to act any differently from an entrepreneur looking to maximize profits is pure folly.  
Interestingly, this viewpoint had not been part of the orthodox views of the time.  As Tullock 
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(2008: p2) explained, the mainstream view was quite the opposite: “Writers who did hold 
[these views], like Machiavelli in parts of The Prince, were regarded as morally suspect and 
tended to be held up as bad examples rather than as profound analysts.”   
 In 1978, Buchanan was invited by the Institute of Economic Affairs to give a lecture at 
a seminar on “The Economics of Politics.”  In it, he began by explaining why the sub-field of 
public choice has been called the “economic theory of politics.”  He says that this theory of 
politics is economic in nature because “like traditional economic theory, the building blocks 
are individuals, not corporate entities, not societies, not communities, not states.  The 
building blocks are living, choosing, economizing persons.”  (Buchanan, 1978, p5) He is 
clearly differentiating the focus on the individual within public choice from the more 
aggregate-centric approaches in orthodox economics and political theory. 
 In a paper describing how he and Gordon Tullock had come up with the ideas in The 
Calculus of Consent, Buchanan (2012: p254) states that both he and Tullock approached 
the topics based on “methodologically individualistic foundations.”  In providing a definition of 
public choice, Buchanan (1984: p13) stated “public choice theory is methodologically 
individualistic, in the same sense that economic theory is.  The basic units are choosing, 
acting, behaving persons rather than organic units such as parties, provinces, or nations.  
Indeed, yet another label for the subject matter here is “An Individualistic Theory of Politics.” 
 In fact, the importance in economics of studying the individual was a long-held belief 
by Buchanan.  As Boettke (1998: p25) explains, Buchanan had challenged Keynesianism in 
his 1958 book Public Principles of Public Debt.  In it, Buchanan took issue with how much 
aggregation was present in Keynesian fiscal theory.  According to Boettke, because of this 
reliance on the aggregate rather than the individual, Buchanan felt that “fiscal theorists were 
unable to address the problem of who pays for the creation of public goods… the principle of 
opportunity cost and economic decision-making was forgotten.”  (Boettke, 1998, p25) As 
stated above, both Boettke (2008) and Baird (1989) describe this same individualism as one 
of the main tenets of Austrian economics.   
Of course, it is hardly controversial to point out that neoclassical economics also 
holds methodological individualism in high regard.  But economists such as Thomas 
DiLorenzo claim that the rigor with which both Buchanan and the Public Choice school, like 
the Austrian school, apply the ideals of methodological individualism is unlike other schools.  
To him, the fact that both public choice and Austrian economists focus on the analysis of the 
individual “has spared [them] from many of the mistakes of what might be called collectivist 
economics.”  (DiLorenzo, 1990, p189) He gives Buchanan credit for “greatly improving our 
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understanding of the political process by scrapping the ‘organic’ view of collective action.”  
Buchanan wrote in 1968: 
Most… economists take an approach different from my own, and 
one that I regard as both confused and wrong.  In my vision of social 
order, individual persons are the basic component units, and 
“government” is simply that complex of institutions through which 
individuals make collective decisions, and through which they carry 
out collective as opposed to private activities.  Politics is the activity 
of persons in the context of such institutions.  (Buchanan, quoted in 
DiLorenzo, 1990, p189) 
 At a minimum, this economic theory of politics by Buchanan and his focus on 
methodological individualism might be straddling both neoclassical and Austrian economics.  
But one could make the argument that Buchanan takes it further than the neoclassicals did. 
Buchanan and… Exchange over Optimization 
 
 Lord Lionel Robbins once defined economics as “the science which studies human 
behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.”  
(Robbins, 1932) Since that publication, neoclassical economists have been laser focused on 
finding the optimal value or utility among those alternative uses.  “Constrained maximization 
– the mathematics of the Lagrangian multiplier – has pride of place in most intermediate and 
graduate level price theory textbooks.”  (Baird, 1989, p205) But as Baird goes on to say, 
Austrian economists, at least modern practitioners, rebel against this definition and focus 
instead on the process of individuals acquiring the necessary information regarding the 
scarcity mentioned by Robbins.  “Exchange with others in pursuit of broadly conceived 
personal gain is the quintessential economic action… on which economic analysis should 
focus its attention.” (Baird, 1989, pp 205-206) Additionally, focus should be paid to who 
exactly is taking part in these exchanges.  Following the previous notions of subjectivism and 
individualism, understanding the identity of the actors involved in the market exchanges is 
vital.  This focus, known as catallactics, centers on “relationships that emerge in the market, 
the bargaining that characterizes the exchange process, and the institutions within which 
exchange takes place.” (Boettke, 2008, p2) 
 Buchanan took great issue with Robbins and his definition for economics in his 1964 
paper, “What Should Economists Do?”  He begins by confronting Robbins head on: “I 
propose to take on Lord Robbins as an adversary and to state, categorically, that his all-too-
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3270253 
persuasive delineation of our subject field has served to retard, rather than to advance 
scientific progress.”  (Buchanan, 1964, p214) His main issue with Robbins (and the 
economists who subscribe to the same view) centers on the lack of attention on the 
individual making the choices about the resources.  “Search [Robbins] as you will, and you 
will not find an explicit statement as to whose ends are alternatives… [He is] wholly silent on 
the identity of the choosing agent.”  (Buchanan, 1964, p214) 
 It should be noted here that there was some pushback at the time against Buchanan 
and his associating Robbins with the notion that economics is merely an exercise in 
allocative mathematics.  Indeed, some of that criticism was from economists who generally 
agreed with Buchanan’s desire to focus on individualism, exchange, and the market.  In one 
review of Buchanan’s paper, Israel Kirzner explains: 
Buchanan's quarrel is not, or ought not to be, with Robbins' own 
emphasis on allocation and choice at all, but is properly to be 
restricted to that literature that is concerned, in the name of 
economics, with the attainment of efficient solutions, and that 
evaluates the market primarily with respect to its efficiency as an 
"allocative mechanism.” (Kirzner, 1965, p258) 
 This blind devotion to maximization in mainstream economics while ignoring the 
involved actors is, according to Buchanan, “not legitimate activity for practitioners in 
economics.”  He goes so far as to suggest that if this is the preferred approach, then further 
study in the field should be left to applied mathematicians rather than “economists.”  He even 
complains about the word “economics,” preferring “catallactics” or “symbiotics.”  For 
Buchanan, the exchange is the thing.  “I want economists to modify their thought processes, 
to look at the same phenomena through ‘another window,’ to use Nietzsche's appropriate 
metaphor. I want them to concentrate on ‘exchange…’”  (Buchanan, 1964, p217) 
 It is interesting that Buchanan had such a focus on catallactics despite his 
background at the University of Chicago with Frank Knight.  In his autobiographical work, 
Economics from the Outside In, Buchanan laments about how Knight, though somewhat 
vague in his own beliefs as to what economics was about, never abandoned the “allocating-
maximizing paradigm which tends to distract attention from the coordination paradigm that 
[Buchanan has] long deemed central to the discipline.”  (Buchanan, 2007, p71) Buchanan 
seems to also find this interesting.  In fact, he appears to align himself with his Austrian 
peers regarding his own focus on catallactics.  “Had I received ‘better’ pre-Chicago training 
in economics…[l]ike so many of my peers, aside from the few who were exposed early to 
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Austrian theory, I might have remained basically an allocationist.” (Buchanan, 2007, p71) 
(emphasis added) 
 In an interview published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Buchanan was 
asked to describe the difference between the allocationist-maximization paradigm, which the 
interviewer describes as neoclassical, and most of Buchanan’s research which has been 
within the catallactic-coordination paradigm.  Buchanan’s response serves to reinforce the 
argument that his work differs from the neoclassicals: 
Economics, as it was transformed by Paul Samuelson into a 
mathematical discipline, required practitioners to have something to 
maximize subject to certain constraints.  This contrasts with the 
catallactic coordination paradigm, which starts out with individuals 
simply trading with each other. You examine this process and build 
up into a system of how markets emerge and become integrated. It's 
a very different conceptualization of the whole economic process.  
(Steelman, 2004, p5) 
 In other writings, Buchanan expressed another criticism of the focus on utility 
maximization.  In a lecture given in 1978, “Natural and Artifactual Man,” he explains that with 
each choice made, the economic actor himself changes.  He compares this to the notion put 
forth by Heraclitus that a man never steps into the same river twice.  After each step and 
economic choice, the river and the market continue to flow, and as time passes the man and 
the entrepreneur changes.  Solving the utility maximization problem does not solve “anything 
that remains stable for more than the logical moment for analysis.”  (Buchanan, 1979, p109) 
With this argument, Buchanan is not only expressing distaste in a focus on constrained 
maximization, but he is also stating an affinity towards the market process and how 
economic actors and situations evolve through the various exchanges that take place. 
 Buchanan further discussed the importance of understanding that economic actors 
are constantly evolving along with their preferences: 
Man wants liberty to become the man he wants to become.  He does 
so precisely because he does not know what man he will want to be 
in time… Man does not want liberty in order to maximize his utility, or 
that of the society of which he is a part. He wants liberty to become 
the man he wants to become. (Buchanan, 1979, p112) 
Buchanan is asserting not only that man is not looking to maximize his utility, but that he is 
looking to change his very self and that man is unaware of what that future version will be 
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like.  The idea of pre-determined preferences, therefore, is anathema to the kind of 
economics that Buchanan is discussing here.  Rizzo (2014), in discussing this theme, stated 
that “Buchanan’s idea of the individual changing or becoming through time is an idea 
congenial to Austrian economics.”  (Rizzo, 2014, p144) 
Buchanan and… Market Process rather than Equilibrium 
 
 The result of the constrained maximization problems previously mentioned is the 
determination of the endpoint for the economy - equilibrium.  This destination is the primary 
focus of neoclassical economics.  Austrians, however, are more interested in the journey 
than the destination.  Such equilibrium can only be achieved through full information, which 
neoclassicals take as given.  But no single party possesses all the necessary information 
necessary to reach such a state.  As one goes through the market process, capitalizing on 
the various relationships present, additional information is acquired.  As the body of 
information grows, including potential profit opportunities, the entrepreneur can use that 
information to gain advantage and wealth.  However, other entrepreneur’s will also 
eventually gain said knowledge and old profit opportunities dissipate.  With each action of 
each entrepreneur, and the movement of the relevant information, the market is forever in 
flux, never truly achieving the equilibrium state that neoclassicals insists is always present.  
(Baird, 1989, pp 206-207) 
 Once again, Buchanan’s writings show a distinct affinity for the market process 
viewpoint of the Austrians.  In arguing what he felt economists “should” do, Buchanan called 
for a move away from the “theory of resource allocation” and instead move toward a “theory 
of markets.”  (Buchanan, 1964, p214) As alluded to in the previous section, he believed the 
market was what can be described as a living organism, continually changing and evolving 
with each exchange.  Relationships are created, information is gained, and new profit 
opportunities arise.  With this constant movement, there is no final resting point.  There are 
always new relationships to form as old ones die, there is always additional information 
gained as old information becomes irrelevant, and as profit opportunities dry up new ones 
are created.  To Buchanan, this reliance on exchange and the market process is not a new 
way of studying economics, and he shows this by quoting what he refers to as a “much-
neglected principle” from Chapter II of The Wealth of Nations where Smith describes the 
very market process that Buchanan espouses: 
It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual, consequence of a 
certain propensity in human nature which has in view no such 
extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange 
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one thing for another.  (Smith as quoted in Buchanan, 1964, p213) 
(emphasis added) 
This aspect of human nature that Smith is talking about is what Buchanan says economists 
should be focusing on.  He goes on to say in that same 1964 paper that economists should 
focus not just on the specific activities, but also the variety of relationships that form because 
of man’s “propensity to truck and to barter.” 
 One of the major assumptions of the neoclassical approach is that markets are 
perfectly competitive.  This is a result of the “full and relevant information” referred to 
previously.  Buchanan attacks this assumption on market competitiveness directly, and here 
again he talks about the market process and about exchange: 
A market is not competitive by assumption or by construction. A 
market becomes competitive, and competitive rules come to be 
established as institutions emerge to place limits on individual 
behavior patterns. It is this becoming process, brought about by the 
continuous pressure of human behavior in exchange, that is the 
central part of our discipline, if we have one, not the dry-rot of 
postulated perfection.  (Buchanan, 1964, p218) 
Additionally, he seems to argue against the notion of setting up mathematical equations to 
determine the general equilibrium point, something that Austrians would also argue against. 
A solution to a general-equilibrium set of equations is not pre-
determined by exogenously-determined rules. A general solution, if 
there is one, emerges as a result of a whole network of evolving 
exchanges, bargains, trades, side payments, agreements, contracts 
which, finally at some point, ceases to renew itself. At each stage in 
this evolution towards solution, there are gains to be made, there are 
exchanges possible, and this being true, the direction of movement 
is modified.  (Buchanan, 1964, p218) 
 Buchanan also took the view, which Baird (1990) likens to Hayek, that markets are 
not explicitly designed by humans but rather they emerge from human action:  
The "market" or market organization is not a means toward the 
accomplishment of anything. It is, instead, the institutional 
embodiment of the voluntary exchange processes that are entered 
into by individuals in their several capacities. This is all that there is 
to it. Individuals are observed to cooperate with one another, to 
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reach agreements, to trade. The network of relationships that 
emerges or evolves out of this trading process, the institutional 
framework, is called "the market."  (Buchanan, 1964, p219) 
 While Buchanan may not have explicitly stated an effort to promote Austrian ideals 
with his views on competition and markets, said ideas were understandably supported by 
those in the Austrian camp.  Kirzner, himself an Austrian, stated the he concurs 
“wholeheartedly” with most of Buchanan’s views, while taking pains to point out that Austrian 
heavyweights such as Mises and Hayek have already expressed similar views (and in a 
stronger fashion).  (Kirzner, 1965, p257) DiLorenzo, another prominent Austrian, sees these 
views by Buchanan as clearly Austrian in nature: 
This approach helps us understand why, in perfect competition, 
there is no competition (or any trade, for that matter). It also reveals 
how a market is not competitive by definition, as in the neoclassical 
model, but that a market becomes competitive… Thus, Buchanan's 
view of the market system may properly be labeled Austrian.  
(DiLorenzo, 1990, p191) (emphasis added) 
Buchanan and… Economics is not an “exact” science 
 
This focus on market exchanges rather than calculations of the equilibrium end 
points naturally leads to the belief among Austrians that “economics is not an exact science 
and that the methodology of exact sciences is not appropriate in economics.”  (Baird, 1989, 
p207) For Austrians, there are far too many subjective variables for mathematics to 
adequately explain any economic conditions.  This is in full contradiction to the neoclassical 
approach.  “The neoclassical mainstream is wont to express assumptions and develop 
models by the manipulation of mathematical equations.  Austrians claim that such exercises 
are redundant at best and often completely misrepresent the actual character and essence 
of human action.”  (Baird, 1989, p208) Austrians may occasionally desire to use 
mathematical models simply as a clarification device or to illustrate a specific point, but such 
models are not what economists should be relying on. 
 Economist Gregory Christainsen once described Buchanan by saying “[he] makes 
little use of mathematics, and in none of his publications, not even one, has he undertaken 
statistical estimates.”  (Christainsen, 1988, p11) Indeed, throughout the discussion thus far, it 
can be concluded that Buchanan took issue with some of the more mathematically based 
applications of economics.  He clearly felt there were too many subjective or otherwise 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3270253 
unknown (and unpredictable) variables involved to make precise mathematical equations 
worthwhile.  This was a sentiment that Buchanan felt from early in his career, when he and 
Warren Nutter established the Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in Political Economy at 
the University of Virginia in the mid to late 1950’s. 
 Boettke (2014: p54) explained that both Buchanan and Nutter were concerned at the 
time that modern economics was losing sight of the contributions of such thinkers as Adam 
Smith and John Stuart Mill in favor of “excessive formalism under the influence of 
Samuelson and excessive aggregation as a consequence of Keynes.”  Due to those two 
developments, the focus of economics was not on the market framework and exchange 
relationships within that market but rather it was on “equilibrium outcome, and the level of 
aggregate economic performance.”  It was these concerns that led to Buchanan and Nutter 
to creating the Center.  According to Buchanan, the establishment of that Center 
“encouraged [him], and others, to counter the increasing technical specialization of 
economics and allowed me to keep the subject matter interesting when the discipline, in 
more orthodox hands, threatened to become boring in the extreme.”  (Buchanan, 2007, p16) 
 Buchanan had previously used the “interesting vs. boring” argument against the 
increasing dependency on mathematical models in economic departments.  Despite 
appearances, it wasn’t simply viewing mathematical models with an elitist’s disdain.  Rather, 
he saw them as superfluous.  “As Frank Knight used to say, most of the empirical work in 
economics is ‘proving water runs downhill,’ a proposition that the Austrians would 
scarcely question.”  (Buchanan, 1979, p88) (emphasis added) In the same paper, 
Buchanan goes on to describe what he saw as “wasted time” studying empirical models, and 
again decrying the “dullness” of it all: 
The young and aspiring economist who becomes the expert 
empiricist has necessarily sacrificed training time in learning more 
about the process to which his highly polished technical tools are to 
be applied. These gaps in the training of modern economists are 
beginning to show up in many forms, not the least of which is the 
deadly dullness that dominates whole departments in many 
universities and colleges.  (Buchanan, 1979, p88) 
 This sentiment that focusing so much on “new” mathematical economics to the 
exclusion of the more philosophical ideals put forth by classic thinkers was a “waste of time” 
and “unnecessary” seemed to be a strong one for Buchanan as it was repeated in one form 
or another throughout his writings.  One additional example is from his essay “Politics 
without Romance…”: 
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Ecclesiastes tells us that there is nothing new under the sun, and in 
a genuine sense, such a claim is surely correct, and especially in the 
so called social sciences.  (I am reminded of this every week when I 
see my mathematically inclined younger colleagues in economics 
rediscovering almost every wheel that older economists have ever 
talked about.)  (Buchanan, 1984, p11) 
 In addition to Nutter and the other economists at the University of Virginia, Buchanan 
asserts he shares this viewpoint with Hayek and Knight, saying “Hayek and Knight were 
sharply critical of any attempts to convert economics into a discipline analogous with a 
natural science.”  (Buchanan, 1979, p84) So Buchanan can appropriately be placed in the 
camp of Austrian economics, at least the Hayekian branch, on the issue of economics as an 
exact science. 
 However, Buchanan and the Austrians did acknowledge that there could be the 
occasional need for such an approach.  In discussing the reliance on mathematics in the 
allocation-maximization approach, Buchanan says: 
I want to note especially here that I am not, through rejecting the 
allocation approach, decrying the desirability, indeed the necessity, 
for mathematical competence. In fact, advances in our 
understanding of symbiotic relationships may well require 
considerably more sophisticated mathematical tools than those 
required in what I have called social engineering. (Buchanan, 1964, 
p221) 
Buchanan did imply though that empiricists should “stay in their lane,” as it were.  “I find no 
difficulty at all in allowing the general equilibrium theorist to do his work alongside his 
subjectivist, nonmathematical counterpart, provided that he does not slip into error by 
somehow imputing, even at some conceptual level, objective meaning into his wholly 
imaginary constructs.”  (Buchanan, 1979, p89) 
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In his own words 
 
 It is worth looking at comments that Buchanan made himself that might give some 
insight as to where he would fit.  Here I examine comments that otherwise do not fit in any of 
the above sections. 
 After winning the Nobel Prize, Buchanan was interviewed for the Austrian Economics 
Newsletter in 1987 and the subject of which school he might belong to came up briefly.  The 
interviewer asked, “Do you consider yourself an Austrian economist?”  Buchanan replied, “I 
certainly have a great deal of affinity with Austrian economics and I have no objections to 
being called an Austrian.  Hayek and Mises might consider me an Austrian but surely some 
of the others would not.” (Thornton, et al., 1987, p4) This is not exactly a clear declaration on 
being an Austrian, but it does suggest a leaning in that direction.  However, even Buchanan 
acknowledges that there is some disagreement.  Whether that disagreement is due to the 
varying criteria in classifying Austrian economics, confusion over the meaning of Buchanan’s 
theories, or perhaps guilt-by-association with Tullock or even Stigler or Coase is unclear. 
 In the same interview, the topic of “subjectivism” was brought up:   
Q: There is a wide spectrum of subjectivism from mainstream 
orthodoxy to Shackle and Lachmann.  Where do you place yourself 
on that spectrum? 
A: Well, I’m certainly much closer to Shackle than I am to the 
mainstream.  I’ve been tempted to go completely along with Shackle 
and become a very radical subjectivist.  But I recognize that if you go 
all the way down that road you end up with a nihilistic position.  I’m 
somewhere between von Mises and Yeager on the one hand and 
Shackle on the other.  The person who comes closest to my 
methodological position is Jack Wiseman.  (Thornton, et al., 1987, 
pp 3-4) 
As written in his obituary, “Jack Wiseman’s distinctive and original academic contributions 
were in the fields of public finance / public sector studies, industry, public choice and 
Austrian economics.” (Hartley, 2000, pF445) So Buchanan’s statement does seem to 
indicate a personal affinity towards the Austrian school. 
 One more example from this 1987 interview also seems to indicate at least a 
similarity between Buchanan and the Austrians.  Buchanan explains “I didn’t become 
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acquainted with Mises until I wrote an article on individual choice and voting in the market in 
1954.  After I had finished the first draft I went back to see what Mises had said in Human 
Action.  I found out, amazingly, that he had come closer to saying what I was trying to say 
than anybody else.”  (Thornton, et al., 1987, p10) 
 In an essay entitled “General Implications of Subjectivism in Economics,” Buchanan 
begins by saying: 
I have often argued that the “Austrians” seem, somehow, to be more 
successful in conveying the central principle of economics to 
students than alternative schools, enclaves or approaches… [M]y 
hypothesis depended, of course, on a definition of just what the most 
important central principle in economics is.  The principle that 
exposure to economics should convey is that of the spontaneous 
coordination which the market achieves.  The central principle of 
economics is not the economizing process; it is not the maximization 
of objective functions subject to constraints.  (Buchanan, 1979, p81) 
He closes the essay by saying: 
Unfortunately, most modern economists have no idea of what they 
are doing or even of what they are ideally supposed to be doing… I 
think I know what I am doing, and I think that most of those who 
espouse a variant of Austrian subjectivist economics know what they 
are doing… I suppose that all of this finally reduces to an admonition 
to keep the faith, whether we want to call this doing economics, 
subjectivist economics, Austrian economics, or something else.  
(Buchanan, 1979, pp 90-91) 
While he doesn’t say it explicitly, Buchanan does appear to be making the case that he is an 
Austrian.  The first quote says that both he and the Austrians follow the same “most 
important central principle” of economics.  The second quote begins by differentiating 
himself from the Austrians, “I know... and the Austrians know…”  But then he closes it with 
“whether we want to call this…Austrian economics…”  Perhaps the “we” is meant to refer to 
non-Austrian subjectivist economists, or perhaps it is meant to refer to the Austrians and 
himself.  Either way, it would be difficult to argue that he sees himself as anything other than 
Austrian. 
 The final quote comes from an interesting find by Peter Boettke.  While conducting 
research within the Buchanan archives, Boettke came across a letter that Buchanan wrote in 
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1962 to the members of the Mont Pelerin Society.  (Buchanan eventually became president 
of the society, a position previously held by Stigler and Friedman, as well as Hayek.  One 
could see how this joint association with neoclassicals and Austrians might add to the 
debate over the proper classification of Buchanan’s economics.)  Boettke (2014: pp 63-64) 
quotes from Buchanan’s letter thusly: 
The appropriate role of the society is that of insuring the survival of a 
set of ideas and ideals, once widely honored, but now held only by a 
minority… [S]terility is the certain result if a deliberate clinging to old 
fashioned clichés and concepts is fostered.  Legitimate survival of 
the time-honored ideals of the free society can be achieved only 
through a continuously critical examination of the bases of libertarian 
doctrine, along with tolerance of change in the structure of libertarian 
thought. 
 I find this quote to be both interesting and relevant, even though it doesn’t explicitly 
express a view on one form of economic thinking or another.  It does, however, speak to the 
introspective and philosophical aspects of what Buchanan felt economists should do.  It was 
written less than two years prior to Buchanan giving his presidential address to the Southern 
Economics Association, which was later turned into his 1964 paper quoted repeatedly here 
entitled “What Should Economists Do?”  In the letter, he speaks of both respecting and 
critically examining “ideas and ideals.”  As Boettke (2014: p64) concludes, this is what 
Buchanan sought with the research programs he helped create.  “The ‘saving the books’ and 
‘saving the ideas’ project… was an upward and onward march out of the hyper-
specialization of mid-twentieth century social science, and an effort instead to integrate the 
disciplines of philosophy, politics and economics into a modern political economy and social 
philosophy program.”  The “mid-twentieth century social science” refers almost certainly to 
the neoclassical approach, and the more introspective program that Boettke is speaking of 
can certainly be taken as more Austrian-leaning economic research. 
Other viewpoints 
 
 As stated at the beginning, there are some who have labeled James Buchanan as a 
neoclassical economist, or at least a bridge between neoclassicals and Austrians.  While 
these claims do exist, they number far less than the number of papers detailing Buchanan’s 
Austrian leanings.  (However, this could be a form of “survivor bias.”  Is it possible that 
Austrian economists are far more likely to write a “History of Economic Thought” analysis of 
Buchanan than a neoclassical economist?  And, wouldn’t the likelihood of a pro-Austrian 
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view of Buchanan be higher from an Austrian than from a neoclassical?)  A few of the claims 
tend to be of the “guilt by association” nature.  But for many of these claims, it depends not 
only on how narrow their definition of Austrian economics is, but also how much of the public 
choice canon they attribute to Buchanan rather than Gordon Tullock or other public choice 
theorists. 
 In the paper entitled “The Ongoing Methodenstreit of The Austrian School,” Jesus 
Huerta de Soto lays out the differences between Austrians and neoclassicals.  He provides 
his own definitions as to what characterizes an Austrian economist, most of which coincide 
with previously referenced lists such as by Boettke or Machlup.  He does make some slight 
refinements, however.  For example, he states:  
For the Austrian theorists, economic science is conceived as a 
theory of action, rather than a theory of decision and this is one of 
the features that most clearly distinguishes them from their 
neoclassical colleagues... Therefore, for the Austrians, economics, 
far from being a theory on choice or decision, is a theory on the 
processes of social interaction… for the Austrians, economics is 
subsumed under or integrated into a much more general and broad 
science, a general theory of human action (not of human decision). 
(de Soto, 1998, p 76-77) 
 The emphasis on Austrian economics not being a theory of decision or choice may 
not be a large difference but it might be enough to not allow Buchanan entry into the 
Austrian school.  de Soto then provides a three-column chart.  The first column lists various 
parameters by which he compares Austrians and neoclassicals, the second column contains 
the Austrian results to those parameters, while the final column contains the neoclassical 
results.  For example, next to “Methodological Starting Point,” he lists “Subjectivism” under 
Austrians and “Methodological Individualism” under neoclassicals.  The two final parameters 
for comparison are “Most recent contributions” and “Relative position of different authors.” de 
Soto lists “Public Choice Theory” and “Buchanan” under the neoclassical column for each, 
respectively.  Unfortunately, he does not comment any further on public choice in general or 
on Buchanan specifically. 
 de Soto (2010: pp 209-210) appeared to further explain his position on public choice 
about ten years later in his book Socialism, Economic Calculation and Entrepreneurship. In 
providing an analysis of Oskar Lange’s “competitive solution” model, he presents a criticism 
of Lange by Buchanan.  He then provides a short background on public choice, saying: “The 
foundations of the public choice school were undoubtedly laid by Mises himself, when he 
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conceived of economics as a very broad science concerned with theoretically studying all 
processes related to human action.”  However, this might not be enough to give public 
choice and/or Buchanan any Austrian credentials in de Soto’s view.  In the same book, he 
had previously noted “I agree with DiLorenzo [1988] that the analysis of [the public choice] 
school has until now been seriously weakened by its excessive dependence on the 
methodology of neoclassical economics.” (de Soto, 2010, p93) So, one can surmise that 
while de Soto sees the foundation that public choice was built on as being Austrian, it was 
corrupted or “weakened” by the reliance on neoclassical theories, perhaps by Buchanan 
himself. 
 The reference to DiLorenzo by de Soto is from a paper entitled “Competition and 
Political Entrepreneurship: Austrian Insights into Public-Choice Theory.”  He begins the 
paper explaining the connection between public choice and neoclassical theory: 
Public choice can be defined as the application of economic theory 
and methodology to the study of politics and political institutions, 
broadly defined. Neoclassical price theory has been one of the 
principal tools of the public-choice theorist, having been applied to 
address such questions as why people vote, why bureaucrats 
bungle, the effects of deficit finance on government spending, and 
myriad other questions regarding the operations and activities of 
governments… But neoclassical price theory has its limitations, 
many of which have been investigated by Austrian economists. 
These limitations have implications for the study of public choice. 
Namely, if neoclassical price theory is itself flawed, then perhaps its 
applications to the study of political decision making has produced 
uncertain results. (DiLorenzo, 1988, p59) 
 Later in the paper, however, he seems to describe Buchanan as a better alternative 
to neoclassical theory.  He begins by explaining (p63) how neoclassicals prefer perfectly 
competitive markets because “they promote allocative efficiency.”  But because Austrians 
believe all costs are subjective, they have no use for such a model. 
To state that a certain allocation of resources is allocatively efficient 
and maximizes "social welfare" is to assume that benefits and costs 
are objective and measurable by some outside observer/social 
engineer. Moreover, to claim that one allocation of resources is 
superior to another on neoclassical efficiency grounds requires one 
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to make interpersonal utility comparisons, a sheer impossibility. 
(DiLorenzo, 1988, p63) 
 This is right in line with Buchanan’s Cost and Choice, as discussed above.  Indeed, 
he then cites Buchanan as providing an example of a different approach to efficiency that is 
individual-centric: “From this perspective, a "better" allocation of resources can only be 
determined by people themselves, not by professional maximizers of social welfare 
functions. The standard of evaluation is ultimately consent among individuals.” (DiLorenzo, 
1988, p64) Perhaps this was an example of viewing public choice as leaning neoclassical 
but not Buchanan.  It is interesting to note that at the conclusion of this paper, DiLorenzo 
says: 
Austrian economics and public choice are two of the most exciting 
areas of economic research… This article is, if anything, a plea to 
consider the two research programs as complementary. Economic 
reasoning can and will be applied to advance our understanding of 
the political process, but one need not adopt the entire neoclassical 
economic framework to do so. (DiLorenzo, 1988, p69) 
 So, in one work, de Soto (1998) is declaring Buchanan and public choice as 
neoclassical, while also indicating they are “not Austrian.”  In a later piece, however, de Soto 
(2010) softens his stance just a bit, allowing for some Austrian influence on public choice by 
way of Mises, and clarifying his view that public choice has “become” neoclassical.  This 
latter view is then substantiated by referencing DiLorenzo (1988).  But that DiLorenzo paper 
doesn’t fully agree with de Soto’s conclusions, and is more “friendly” to the idea that 
Buchanan and perhaps even public choice might fit under the Austrian umbrella. 
 The notion that Buchanan might lean more toward the Austrians while public choice 
might be more neoclassical is not entirely foreign or off-base.  It can at least in part be traced 
to Buchanan himself.  In his paper “Genesis,” he refers to a difference between himself and 
his Calculus of Consent co-writer, Gordon Tullock: “Economics, defined as a broad and 
inclusive research program, falls variously along a methodological spectrum between 
predictive science and philosophical inquiry. If classification is restricted to the polar 
extremes, Tullock becomes the scientist of the authorship pairing while Buchanan assumes 
the philosopher's role.” (Buchanan, 2012, p254) One could argue from this quote that 
Buchanan sees himself as the more introspective Austrian economist, believing in the 
importance of subjectivity rather than the more scientific, and neoclassical, objectivity, like 
Tullock. 
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 Boettke (1987) took a similar view.  From the introduction: 
George Mason University provides a unique institutional environment 
for exploring the relationship between the “Virginia” or Public Choice 
school of political economy and Austrian economics.  The strength of 
this relationship becomes particularly apparent if we consider the 
branch of public choice economics associated with James 
Buchanan.  The other branch of the Virginia school, which derives its 
research program mainly from Gordon Tullock, is, I would argue, 
more consistent with the neoclassical paradigm than the Austrian 
one... (Boettke, 1987, p7) 
From this, not only do we see that Buchanan can be associated with the Austrians while 
Tullock is grouped with the neoclassicals, but also that there may be more than one branch 
of public choice, one for each school.  This certainly could, then, lead to confusion as to how 
to classify Buchanan and public choice in general.  Indeed, Boettke quotes Buchanan from 
his book Liberty, Market, and State: 
I think it is accurate to say that my own emphasis was on modeling 
politics-as-exchange, under the acknowledged major influence of 
Knut Wicksell’s great work in public finance.  By comparison (and 
interestingly because he was not initially trained as an economist), 
Gordon Tullock’s emphasis… was on modeling public choosers 
(voters, politicians, bureaucrats) in strict self-interest terms.  There 
was a tension present as we worked through the analysis of that 
book, but a tension that has indeed served us well over the two 
decades since initial publication.  (Buchanan, quoted by Boettke, 
1987, p1) 
 Boettke stops short of saying that Buchanan is an Austrian, but he does suggest that 
he is a link between public choice theory and Austrian economics.  First in the introduction 
where he says that Buchanan represents a relationship between the two, and then later he 
explains further: “By merging public choice insights with Austrian analysis – a framework in 
which Buchanan fits quite comfortably – Austrians can improve their understanding of 
political economy and buttress their case for individual liberty.”  (Boettke, 1987, p14) 
 Another writer who described a dichotomy within public choice was Fu-Lai Tony Yu.  
In the conclusion to his book, Yu (2011: pp 177-178) writes: 
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Ever since founded by James Buchanan, the Public Choice School 
has developed into two streams: namely neoclassical Public Choice 
School and subjectivist Public Choice School. The former uses 
neoclassical optimization method to study the government, while the 
latter, in original Buchanan’s flavor, understand the government in 
the subjectivist perspective. 
Yu then goes on to explain how this “subjectivist perspective” is like the Austrians, 
particularly when it comes to Buchanan’s view on cost, whereby he cites Cost and Choice, 
and with Buchanan’s firm stance on methodological individualism, which is seemingly in 
contradiction to de Soto’s view that methodological individualism falls under the purview of 
the neoclassicals. 
 The “AfterEcon” blog, moderated by George Mason University Economics PhD 
candidate John Vandivier, had a post entitled “James Buchanan and the Synthesis of 
Austrian and Neoclassical Economics.”  In it, he points to several links that could be drawn 
between Buchanan and neoclassicals like Ronald Coase.  For example, Coase wrote his 
“Problem of Social Cost” paper while working in the Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in 
Political Economy at the University of Virginia, while Buchanan was also working at the 
Center, which he helped create.  Vandivier goes on to point out a similarity between public 
choice and Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), of which Coase was a major contributor: 
Public Choice emphasizes the notion that political failure exists and 
therefore market failure may be preferred to political failure, so long 
as the market fails to a lesser degree than the political system. TCE 
also emphasizes this notion through the concept of remediableness. 
A market is considered efficient if there are no more efficient 
available coordination systems, even if the market produces an 
outcome less efficient than a competition-theoretic market would. 
(Vandivier, 2016) 
Certainly, Buchanan is not a neoclassical based on the examples that Vandivier provides, 
and it isn’t even clear how one can claim that either he or public choice theory in general 
represents a synthesis of Austrian and neoclassical economics.  But it is noteworthy that, 
despite the neoclassical connections Vandivier claims to be present, Buchanan and public 
choice are also seen as connected to the Austrian school.   
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Conclusion 
 There is enough explicit evidence that Buchanan was not a neoclassical economist.  
There is also ample evidence, as shown in this paper, that he should be considered an 
Austrian economist, with the caveat that the etymology of the term “Austrian economist” 
remains somewhat unsettled.  Many of Buchanan’s writings, particularly his two most 
prominent works (Calculus of Consent and Cost and Choice) lean heavily toward the 
Austrian school and away from the neoclassical approach.  But is this enough to claim that 
Buchanan was, indeed, an Austrian?  Some, like de Soto, seem to hold to a strict 
interpretation of what it means to be an Austrian.  Supporters of this view might disqualify 
Buchanan because other public choice scholars are neoclassical, and following a backwards 
induction approach, Buchanan must be as well.  Others, like Boettke, Baird, Yu, and perhaps 
even DiLorenzo, are more inclusive in their definitions.  They don’t all agree that Buchanan 
was an Austrian, but at a minimum they all see that his writings can fit comfortably within the 
Austrian canon.   
 The notion of inclusiveness is what it seems the question comes down to – how 
narrow or broad one defines Austrian economics.  Yaeger (2014) makes this very point in 
addressing a possible Austrian connection to Buchanan’s work: Here the question is how 
narrow or how broad a meaning to give to ‘Austrian economist’… But on a quite inclusive 
interpretation of ‘Austrian economist’, Buchanan might count as one.”  Even Yaeger seems 
conflicted, however, as he goes on to point out that the only two economists Buchanan ever 
gave credit to for influencing his work were Knight and Wicksell.  Not even in his Nobel 
acceptance speech, given for his work in public choice, did he mention any Austrian 
influence. 
 Over time, heterodox schools such as the Austrian school seem to be accepted more 
and more by the mainstream.  But they are still viewed as outsiders.  Mainstream 
economists tend to dismiss Austrian works due to, among other things, the lack of rigorous 
empirical proofs.  But part of the blame can be placed on Austrians themselves.  As 
Buchanan (1979: pp 83-84) explains: “It seems to me that one of the dangers of the 
subjectivist approach, and particularly in its pure Austrian variant, is the tendency to form a 
priesthood, with the converted talking only to those who are converts, and with the deliberate 
withdrawal from free and open espousal of subjectivist notions to the world around.”  It is 
along similar lines that strict adherence to an inelastic definition of “Austrian economics” 
such as has been discussed above fosters the very dismissiveness that some Austrians 
might denounce as elitist or out-of-touch.  Being more inclusive in their grouping would 
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certainly lead to growth within the field.  As was pointed out by Boettke (1987, p14), 
Austrians can gain a great deal from Buchanan and public choice theory. 
 Assigning labels retroactively can often lead to disagreement.  Nevertheless, it is a 
somewhat common occurrence in fields such as History of Economic Thought, and the field 
is all the better for it.  Such debate can seem irrelevant at times and one could argue that the 
participants lose the focus of the economic works while needlessly trying to affix some 
classification to the economist.  But, to borrow from Buchanan and his letter to the Mont 
Pelerin Society members, “…survival of the time-honored ideals of the free society can be 
achieved only through a continuously critical examination…” of said ideals.  Debates such as 
this over schools of thought represent that continuous critical examination Buchanan spoke 
of.  Through continued appreciation, examination, and introspection, the field of economics 
can mature and progress forward.  Which is what Buchanan was calling on his fellow 
economists to do. 
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